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A young female rhesus macaque steals fur-
tive glances at the male off to her right. He 
just arrived to the territory and therefore 
immediately piques her interest. The alpha 
male, however, sits a few meters off, bask-
ing in the sun. Being in estrus, the young fe-
male faces a choice: solicit a mating from the 
alpha male or follow the unfamiliar male into 
the brush to sneak a mating with him. Mat-
ing with the alpha male almost guarantees 
“good genes” for her offspring. But some-
thing pushes her toward the unfamiliar male. 
Mating with him reduces the probability of 
inbreeding and adds a bit of genetic diver-
sity to her offspring. Additionally, mating 
with the new male could act as an invest-
ment in the future: The current alpha male is 
getting old, and befriending a prospective al-
pha male could yield future benefits. In ad-
dition, spreading the possibility of paternity 
may secure protection for the offspring. Yet, 
this mating also involves risks. Males often 
vocalize while mating, which attracts the at-
tention of other males. If the unfamiliar male 
vocalizes, the alpha male may attack the fe-
male. Should she take the safe option or risk 
punishment for possible future payoffs? 
Primates constantly face decisions that 
influence their survival and reproduction. 
Continue foraging in this tree or move on to 
another? Expose oneself to a hidden pred-
ator by straying from the group or enjoy 
the safety of having other potential victims 
nearby? Defend one’s territory from invaders 
or abandon it and seek a new home? In all of 
these cases, primates must trade off the costs 
and benefits associated with uncertain and 
delayed decision outcomes. The outcomes of 
these choices influence survival and repro-
duction, and natural selection should favor 
those individuals whose choices lead to the 
propagation of their genes. 
The vast majority of economic analyses of 
decision making define good or “rational” de-
cisions as those consistent with a set of math-
ematical principles. Yet, this ignores the evo-
lutionary pressures on decision making for 
the sake of mathematical elegance (Kacelnik, 
2006; Stevens, 2008). Meanwhile, the standard 
psychological view of decision making seeks 
to empirically undermine the economic the-
ory but cannot offer an alternative explan-
atory theory. Here, I emphasize an evolu-
tionarily informed framework for studying 
decision making: the bounded and ecologi-
cal rationality approaches (Gigerenzer et al., 
1999). Though these approaches have tradi-
tionally focused on human decision making, 
they are just as relevant for other species, in-
cluding other primates. To illustrate the rele-
vance of bounded and ecological rationality 
to the study of primate decision making, I be-
gin by introducing various visions of rational-
ity found in the economic and psychological 
study of decision making. I then explore how 
primate studies inform three aspects of deci-
sion making: utility, uncertainty, and time. 
Together, these aspects will guide our under-
standing of the evolutionary origins of pri-
mate and human rationality. 
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Visions of Rationality 
Rationality means different things to dif-
ferent people. Kacelnik (2006) proposed that 
rationality refers to decisions that are ei-
ther (1 ) consistent with expected utility maxi-
mization for economists and psychologists, 
(2) consistent within the self for philosophers, 
and (3) consistent with fitness enhancement for 
biologists. Of particular relevance here are 
the economic, psychological, and biological 
views. A review of these visions of rational-
ity will frame the question, “Are primates ra-
tional decision makers?” 
Rational Choice 
Which would you prefer: receiving two 
bananas with certainty or receiving either 
one or three bananas with equal probabil-
ity? Depending on whether you like bananas 
and your level of hunger, this may be tricky 
to answer. These questions of decisions un-
der risk mirror fundamental choices that we 
and other animals frequently face. Very lit-
tle in life is certain, so all organisms choose 
between options without knowing the exact 
consequences. 
Economists have approached the ques-
tion of uncertainty by developing expected 
utility theory (reviewed in Wu et al., 2004) 
. In expected utility theory, three features 
characterize all options: magnitude, util-
ity, and probability. Magnitude (x) refers to 
the amount of the benefit (or cost) associated 
with the option. Utility (u) is the mapping of 
magnitude onto some measure of satisfaction 
or “goodness.”1 Finally, probability (p) is the 
chance that the outcome occurs. Thus, if one 
faces risky options, the expected utility is EU 
= p × u(x ), where utility is some function of 
magnitude. Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1947) formalized expected utility theory to 
show that following specific mathematical 
principles maximizes expected utility. There-
fore, expected utility acts as a normative 
standard for what decision makers should 
maximize when making risky choices. 
Expected utility maximization assumes 
consistent choice, which requires a num-
ber of principles to hold (reviewed in Luce 
& Raiffa, 1957; Rieskamp et al., 2006b). First, 
choices must be transitive, meaning that a 
fixed order of preference exists. If an individ-
ual prefers bananas over apples and apples 
over oranges, then he or she must prefer ba-
nanas over oranges to maintain transitivity. 
Second, when transitive, choices are also in-
dependent from irrelevant alternatives, mean-
ing the relative preference between options 
should not be affected by the presence or ab-
sence of other options. If bananas are pre-
ferred to apples, the addition of watermel-
ons to the choice set should not affect the 
banana/apple preference. Finally, choices 
must be invariant, meaning that option A is 
preferred to B regardless of presentation for-
mat. If endowed with a banana and an apple 
and asked to give up one, preferences should 
be the same as if asked to choose freely be-
tween a banana and apple. Given these and a 
few other principles, one can show that pref-
erences follow expected utility calculations. 
Irrational Choice? 
Not long after von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1947) published the principles of ex-
pected utility theory, cracks began appear-
ing in the mathematically elegant framework 
when data showed violations of expected util-
ity predictions (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961). 
Soon afterward, Kahneman and Tversky 
started a cottage industry of demonstrating vi-
olations of the theoretical predictions (Kahne-
man & Tversky, 2000; Kahneman et al., 1982; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In both experi-
mental settings and in real-world decisions, 
laypeople and experts made “ irrational” 
choices.2 Subjects showed intransitivity, irrel-
evant alternatives changed preferences, and 
the framing of decision questions greatly in-
fluenced preferences. Economists minimized 
the problem by calling these findings “anoma-
lies,” whereas psychologists emphasized their 
robustness and labeled them “biases.” To psy-
chologists, expected utility theory was deeply 
flawed because it rested purely on mathe-
matically derived principles and not what we 
know about human behavior. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) injected a 
bit of psychological realism into decision the-
ory when they proposed prospect theory. In-
stead of using a utility function character-
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ized over total wealth, prospect theory uses 
a value function v(x) relative to a reference 
point. So with 100 bananas in the bank, a de-
cision maker would view a choice between 
gaining one and losing three bananas as a 
choice between 101 and 97 bananas from the 
expected utility perspective but a choice be-
tween gaining one and losing three from the 
prospect theory account. In addition to alter-
ing the reference point of the value function, 
prospect theory integrated data about proba-
bility perception into the equation by adding 
a decision weight function to the probabil-
ity. Thus, instead of having a linear relation-
ship between the objective probability and 
the perceived probability, prospect theory as-
sumes that people tend to overestimate low 
probabilities and underestimate high proba-
bilities. The probability, then, is weighted by 
the function π(p) . Thus, prospect theory pre-
dicts that preferences depend on which op-
tion has the highest value V = π(p) × v(x). As 
a descriptive theory, it nicely fits people’s 
preferences (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; 
Wu et al., 2004). However, it does not explain 
why we have reference points or nonlinear 
value functions—it takes these as givens and 
describes how they influence decisions. 
Bounded and Ecological Rationality 
Expected utility theory is mathematically 
elegant but fails to account for many of the 
data. Prospect theory fares much better de-
scriptively but lacks explanatory power. Pa-
rameters in the models are fit to the data, 
with no a priori predictions about parame-
ter values. Prospect theory therefore offers a 
slight modification of expected utility theory 
by patching a few of the holes that data have 
poked into the theory. But both theories face 
a more fundamental problem. Namely, nei-
ther of these theories adequately addresses 
two crucial components of decision making: 
the structure of the mind and the structure of 
the decision-making environment. Early in 
the study of decision making, Simon (1955, 
1956) highlighted not only the study of the 
mind but also the fit between the mind and 
the environment. He criticized the unrealis-
tic assumption that decision makers have in-
finite time to decide, full knowledge of the 
problem, and unlimited computational re-
sources to find an optimal solution to a de-
cision problem. This vision of unbounded 
rationality contrasts sharply with what we 
know about human cognition and deci-
sion making, so Simon proposed the study 
of bounded rationality—the exploration of de-
cision making given realistic assumptions 
about cognitive abilities. Real-world decision 
makers lack knowledge and cannot use opti-
mization processes to make decisions. Thus, 
much previous research has ignored cogni-
tive processes at work in decision making 
(but see Payne et al., 1993). The bounded ra-
tionality approach calls for realistic mod-
els of the decision process based on what we 
know about cognition rather than on a set of 
mathematical principles. Knowing the un-
derlying process can help us better under-
stand the decisions. Yet, Simon emphasized 
that studying only the mind gives you but 
half of the picture. 
To fully understand decision making, 
we must embed the mind in the environ-
ment. Gigerenzer and colleagues (1999) have 
termed this ecological rationality—the match 
between a decision mechanism and the en-
vironment. The unbounded rationality ap-
proach assumes that expected utility works 
in all decision-making situations—it applies 
universally. Ecological rationality, however, 
appeals to the evolutionary idea that adap-
tations match the environment in which they 
evolved. Therefore, decision mechanisms 
should not be universal and domain gen-
eral but specifically tailored to the environ-
ment in which they operate (Barkow et al., 
1992) . In fact, ecological rationality suggests 
that we do not possess a single, complex de-
cision-making mechanism used in all con-
texts. Rather, we have an “adaptive toolbox” 
of mechanisms (including simple heuristics 
or rules of thumb) that, when used in the ap-
propriate environment, perform quite well 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999). This perspective, 
then, offers an explanation for the anomalies 
and biases seen by the experimental econ-
omists and psychologists. Rather than be-
ing evidence for flawed thinking and irratio-
nality, we are simply putting these decision 
mechanisms in an unfamiliar and artificial 
environment—the experimental laboratory. 
Rati o n a l De c i s i o n Mak i n g i n PR i Mate s 101
In general, however, our decision mecha-
nisms serve us quite well by exploiting crit-
ical aspects of the environment. 
Both bounded and ecological rational-
ity offer appealing alternatives to the stan-
dard unbounded approach because they 
rest on realistic evolutionary principles in-
stead of mathematical formalizations. Com-
parative analyses provide a unique method 
for testing questions of bounded and ecolog-
ical rationality because we have great vari-
ability across species in their ecological en-
vironments. Primates offer an ideal group 
of species for these investigations because 
their phylogenetic proximity allows us to 
test interesting hypotheses about the evo-
lution of human decision making. With this 
framework in hand, we can now review the 
bounded and ecological rationality of pri-
mate decisions. Note that here I focus on 
what has traditionally been termed “indi-
vidual decision making.” Though it is likely 
impossible to completely extract an individ-
ual from the social environment (Stevens & 
King, in press) , for the purposes of this re-
view I will put aside the exciting and com-
plicated world of social decision making in 
primates and refer the reader to Maestrip-
ieri (Chapter 19) or Rosati, Santos, and Hare 
(Chapter 7). Instead, I will focus on three im-
portant components of individual decision 
making3: utility, uncertainty, and time. 
Utility and Preference 
Utility refers to the mapping of the mag-
nitude of a benefit or cost onto some measure 
of “goodness” or goal achievement (Baron, 
2000), and a utility function describes this 
mapping. Utility itself is difficult to assess, 
so typically we measure choices to infer pref-
erences. For expected utility theory to work, 
preferences must follow the principles men-
tioned previously: transitivity, independence 
of irrelevant alternatives, and invariance. 
It is well established that humans violate 
these principles, deviating from the norma-
tive standard (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). 
The question remains, “Is this the appropri-
ate standard?” Examining choices in other 
species can address this question, because 
if other species also show the biases, then 
we likely are using the wrong standard. Do 
other primates violate these standards, sug-
gesting deep evolutionary roots, or do only 
humans show these violations? 
Transitive preferences4 are not well stud-
ied in primates. Though other species seem 
to show intransitivity (Shafir, 1994; Waite, 
2001b), few data exist for primates, so we 
will not consider transitivity here.5 
The principle of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives implies that previously available 
options should not influence the current pref-
erences (Simonson & Tversky, 1992). Waite 
(2001a), however, found that the background 
context does matter for gray jays (Perisoreus 
canadensis). When required to pay a lower 
relative cost for food in previous choices, the 
birds reduced their preference for that option 
later when required to pay a higher relative 
cost. Tinklepaugh (1928) found a similar re-
sult in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) and 
long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis). 
These monkeys observed an experimenter 
place a banana under one of two cups. The 
monkeys then immediately chose the cor-
rect cup and received the banana. However, 
in some trials, the experimenter substituted a 
piece of lettuce under the cup, unbeknownst 
to the monkeys. When the monkeys lifted the 
cups and found the lettuce, they rejected the 
less-preferred food item. Though outside of 
this context the monkeys readily consumed 
lettuce, they refused to eat it when expecting 
a banana. Thus, preferences are not fixed but 
depend on previous options. 
Tinklepaugh’s data suggest that the mon-
keys do not have absolute preferences. If 
they did, they would always consume the 
lettuce because it is always better than noth-
ing. However, the preference for consum-
ing lettuce is relative to the previous avail-
ability of the highly preferred banana. The 
preference is relative to an expectation of 
other options. There are good, adaptive rea-
sons for avoiding absolute preferences. For 
instance, it is well known in foraging the-
ory that optimal choices depend on the back-
ground environment. If the environment is 
rich, animals should “skim the cream” and 
choose to invest little time in extracting food 
from patches; if, however, the environment 
is poor, they should more thoroughly ex-
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ploit the patches (Stephens & Krebs, 1986). 
Houston (1997) argued that since the cur-
rent choice is incorporated into the estimate 
of the background environment for the next 
choice point, preferences can change for the 
same set of options depending on the previ-
ous background environment. Thus, relative 
preferences can result from an ecologically 
rational mechanism of adaptive decision 
making. 
The classical economic approach to ra-
tionality also assumes that decision mak-
ers have strictly ordered preferences that 
are invariant to extraneous characteristics 
of the choice situation. If an agent prefers 
A to B, it should always prefer A, regard-
less of whether one is buying or selling A, or 
whether other choices are made before the 
A/B choice, etc. A common violation of in-
variance found in behavioral economics is 
the endowment effect. This phenomenon oc-
curs when decision makers have a higher 
preference for an object when they own it 
(Kahneman et al., 1990). In humans, this is 
typically demonstrated by showing that sub-
jects require a higher price to sell an object 
they possess than to buy the same object. 
Brosnan and colleagues (2007) tested similar 
effects in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) by of-
fering them a choice between two different 
food items and recording their preferences. 
The experimenters then endowed the chim-
panzees with one of the items and measured 
their willingness to trade for the other item. 
The choice preferences and trading prefer-
ences did not match, suggesting an endow-
ment effect. Similar results have been found 
for brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella; 
Lakshminarayanan et al., 2008). Though 
anomalous to economists, an evolution-
ary perspective provides an explanation for 
the endowment effect. The question of why 
owners fight harder than intruders to main-
tain a resource has a long history in behav-
ioral ecology (Hammerstein, 1981; Krebs & 
Davies, 1993; Maynard Smith & Parker, 1976) 
. Ownership has its privileges, including ad-
ditional knowledge about a resource. Even 
without direct benefits, as an arbitrary rule, 
respecting ownership can avoid costly con-
flicts. Thus, owning a resource can increase 
its value. 
Utility Building Blocks 
Simon’s (1955, 1956) vision of bounded ra-
tionality emphasized realistic assumptions 
about the cognitive abilities of decision mak-
ers. Applying this perspective suggests that 
we need to consider both the cognitive build-
ing blocks or evolved capacities needed for ex-
hibiting preferences and the limits placed on 
these capacities. 
Magnitude Perception 
A critical component of exhibiting prefer-
ences is the ability to perceive differences in 
magnitude between options. Preferring two 
bananas to one requires discriminating be-
tween the amounts two and one. There are 
many mechanisms used to quantify objects in 
the world, and many studies have explored 
these mechanisms in primates (reviewed in 
Brannon, 2005a,b; Hauser & Spelke, 2004). 
Brannon et al. (Chapter 8) provide a useful 
overview of primate quantification in this vol-
ume, but it is worthwhile to briefly describe 
two of these mechanisms. The first mecha-
nism discriminates between quantities only 
approximately via the analog magnitude sys-
tem. Importantly, the discriminations fol-
low Weber’s law: Variance in the represen-
tation increases with magnitude (Gallistel, 
1990). This results in the ratio between quan-
tities rather than the absolute magnitude driv-
ing the discrimination. The approximate num-
ber system yields a limit to the precision with 
which individuals can discriminate magni-
tudes, with larger magnitudes being more dif-
ficult than smaller ones (Figure 1). In addition 
to the approximate system, both humans and 
other primates seem to have a precise system 
that tracks individual objects. With this sys-
tem, individuals can enumerate discrete quan-
tities but only up to a maximum of three or 
four objects (Hauser et al., 2000). Therefore, 
the precision that primates can exhibit in their 
preferences depends on the magnitude of the 
amount: They can precisely choose between 
small amounts and approximately choose be-
tween larger amounts. 
The standard rationality approach would 
assume that if an organism has the more 
precise system, it should use it when mak-
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ing quantity judgments. However, Stevens 
and colleagues (2007) showed that cotton-
top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) used the ap-
proximate system in a foraging task, even 
though this species can use the precise sys-
tem (Hauser et al., 2003; Uller et al., 2001). 
The tamarins used the simpler, approxi-
mate system as a default mechanism unless 
the task demanded the more precise system. 
Thus, different aspects of the decision en-
vironment trigger different mechanisms of 
discrimination.
Valuation
Options differ not only in quantity but 
also in quality. In many cases, decision mak-
ers face choices between qualitatively differ-
ent reward types, both within and between 
reward domains. To choose between dif-
ferent types of food or even between differ-
ent types of reward (food, water, sex, social 
contact), animals must have a mechanism 
to evaluate the utility of these reward types; 
that is, they must have a valuation mecha-
nism that converts different reward types 
into a common currency. Padoa-Schioppa 
and colleagues (2006) explored how capu-
chin monkeys traded off different amounts 
of various food types to generate a valua-
tion function (e.g., one piece of apple may be 
worth three pieces of carrot). Deaner and col-
leagues (2005) pitted juice rewards against 
social information in rhesus macaques. Male 
monkeys chose between receiving juice and 
viewing images of either higher-ranking 
males’ faces, lower-ranking males’ faces, or 
female perinea (sexual areas). Interestingly, 
the valuation functions showed that the 
monkeys would forego juice to view high-
ranking males and female perinea but had to 
be “paid” in juice to view low-ranking males. 
Comparing these kinds of qualitatively dif-
ferent rewards is a critical capacity for deci-
sion making, although we do not have good 
cognitive models for how these tradeoffs 
occur.
Inhibitory Control
Organisms must not only discriminate the 
magnitudes of benefits to establish a pref-
erence but also must favor the larger (pos-
itive) outcome. When motivated, this is 
not a problem for primates (except for very 
large rewards; see Silberberg et al., 1998). In 
fact, primates have a very difficult time go-
ing against this preference. In a task in which 
chimpanzees had to point to the smaller 
of two rewards to receive the larger re-
ward, they failed miserably (Boysen & Ber-
ntson, 1995). In addition to the chimpan-
zees, bonobos (Pan paniscus), gorillas (Gorilla 
gorilla), orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), rhe-
Figure 1. Weber’s law states that the variance around estimates of quantity increases with magni-
tude. Smaller quantities therefore are easier to discriminate than larger quantities. For instance, there 
may be little variance for estimations of three and five objects, so discriminating between them is 
easy. However, the variance dramatically increases for 11 and 13 objects, and estimates greatly over-
lap for these durations, making them difficult to distinguish.
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sus and Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata), 
squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus), tama-
rins, and lemurs (Eulemur fulvus and E. ma-
caco) all fail, at least initially, on this task (An-
derson et al., 2000; Genty et al., 2004; Kralik 
et al., 2002; Murray et al., 2005; Silberberg & 
Fujita, 1996; Vlamings et al., 2006). Clearly, 
an unboundedly rational agent would adapt 
quickly to the contingencies of this task, but 
the preference for a large reward is so pow-
erful that primates cannot inhibit their pro-
pensity to choose this. Of course, evolution-
arily, it makes sense to employ the simple 
heuristic “choose the larger.” When in an or-
ganism’s ecology would they opt for a small 
reward when a larger is present? This must 
occur only rarely.
Uncertainty and Risk
In a letter to Jean-Baptiste Leroy, Benja-
min Franklin stated that “in this world noth-
ing can be said to be certain, except death 
and taxes” (13 November 1789). That leaves 
a lot of uncertainty in the world. As agents 
navigating in this world, we must deal with 
this uncertainty in an adaptive manner. 
Knight (1921) posited a useful distinction be-
tween uncertainty (not knowing the distribu-
tion of possible payoffs) and risk (knowing 
the distribution of payoffs but not know-
ing which payoff will be realized). Though 
we and other animals frequently face uncer-
tainty, this is difficult to study in the labora-
tory, so we will focus on risk.
Risky Gambles
Much of the work undermining classi-
cal expected utility theory involved asking 
human subjects about their preferences in 
risky gambles. Rather than the banana ex-
amples suggested previously, subjects chose 
between risky reward amounts. Would you 
prefer a 50% chance of receiving $100 (and a 
50% chance of receiving nothing) or a 100% 
chance of receiving $50? Though these two 
options have equal expected values, most 
people have a strong preference for the sure 
thing—they avoid risk. Risk-averse prefer-
ences arise with nonlinear utility functions, 
specifically when utility increases at a slower 
rate than the magnitude of the benefit (Fig. 
6.2). In general, this seems to be the case for 
human risk preferences for intermediate to 
large gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
Interestingly, nonhuman animals seem to 
show a similar pattern. Animals typically are 
tested by repeatedly experiencing choices sim-
ilar to the banana examples mentioned pre-
Figure 2. If utility is a linear function of magnitude (red line), then decision makers should be neutral 
to risk; they should be indifferent between a guaranteed banana and a 50/50 chance of no bananas or 
two bananas. If utility increases at a decelerating rate with magnitude (blue line), increments of util-
ity are less valuable at larger magnitudes than they are at smaller magnitudes. Satiation offers an im-
portant biological example of diminishing utility because limited gut capacity constrains the utility 
of excess amounts of food. The additional utility of receiving three over two bananas is high, but the 
additional utility of receiving 103 over 102 is not as great, primarily because no one can consume 102 
bananas. Diminishing utility implies risk aversion because the additional gain of the risky option is 
valued less than the loss.
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viously. In a review of risk sensitivity in over 
25 species, Kacelnik and Bateson (1996) found 
that most species were either risk averse or 
risk neutral. Work on primates, however, has 
provided a more mixed result. Early tests of 
risk sensitivity in rhesus monkeys showed risk 
aversion (Behar, 1961). Yet, more recent stud-
ies have shown a preference for risky rewards 
in these macaques (Hayden & Platt, 2007; Mc-
Coy & Platt, 2005) . Meanwhile, cotton-top 
tamarins and bonobos (Pan paniscus) seem to 
avoid risk, while common marmosets (Calli-
thrix jacchus) ignore risk and chimpanzees pre-
fer risk (Heilbronner et al., 2008, unpublished 
data). Why does such variation exist? 
Variation in Risk Preferences 
One of the first hypotheses proposed to 
account for differences in risk sensitivity was 
the “energy budget rule” (Caraco et al., 1980; 
Stephens, 1981). This rule suggests that hun-
gry individuals should prefer risks because 
the safe option will not allow them to sur-
vive. Though this seems to work in some sit-
uations, there is no evidence for this rule in 
primates. Hayden and Platt (2007) tested an 
alternative idea proposed by Rachlin and col-
leagues (1986). Instead of preferring risky op-
tions because of hunger, animals may prefer 
risky options when they require low costs—
specifically, when another choice will arise 
soon. Repeatedly choosing the risky op-
tion guarantees receiving the large payoff at 
some point. With short time delays between 
choices, waiting a few more seconds for this 
jackpot is not that costly. Rhesus macaques 
seem to follow this rule. The macaques pre-
ferred the risky option more when facing 
shorter delays between choices than with 
larger delays (Hayden & Platt, 2007). 
The ecological rationality approach may 
also account for some of the patterns of risk 
preferences seen in primates. In particular, 
when species experience risk in their natu-
ral ecology, they may have decision rules that 
bias them toward risky options. With this hy-
pothesis in mind, Heilbronner and colleagues 
(2008) predicted a species difference in risk 
preferences between chimpanzees and bono-
bos. Although their diets overlap quite a bit in 
their natural habitat, bonobos feed primarily 
on terrestrial herbaceous vegetation, an abun-
dant and reliable food source, and chimpan-
zees rely more on fruit, a more temporally and 
spatially variable food source (Wrangham & 
Peterson, 1996). Moreover, chimpanzees face 
risks when they hunt monkeys and other 
small mammals; bonobos rarely hunt. Inter-
estingly, wild chimpanzees engage in this 
risky activity more often when fruit is abun-
dant rather than scarce, a direct contrast to the 
energy budget hypothesis for risk-seeking be-
havior (Gilby & Wrangham, 2007). Given the 
generally higher level of risky choice in chim-
panzees, Heilbronner and colleagues pre-
dicted that this would select for risk-taking 
decision mechanisms. As predicted, chimpan-
zees preferred the risky choice in a laboratory 
experiment, whereas bonobos preferred the 
safe option. Therefore, to exploit risky options 
in their natural environment, natural selection 
has likely endowed chimpanzees with ecolog-
ically rational decision mechanisms, yielding 
preferences for risky outcomes even in captive 
laboratory situations. 
The Framing of Risk 
Though risk aversion and risk-seeking 
preferences do not pose a great challenge to 
expected utility theory, framing effects do 
challenge the theory. Prospect theory high-
lights two types of framing effects: reference 
dependence and loss aversion (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1991). Reference dependence re-
fers to viewing choices as gains or losses rel-
ative to a reference point rather than as ab-
solute increases or decreases in utility. Thus, 
a set of outcomes could result in the ex-
act same levels of wealth but be framed as a 
gain or loss. In the classic Asian disease prob-
lem, a medical treatment has a particular ef-
fectiveness in combating a disease (Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1981). However, when the 
outcome of a treatment is framed as num-
ber of people saved (a gain), subjects pre-
fer the risky option more than when framed 
as number of people that die (a loss). Thus, 
framing the exact same outcome as either 
saving or losing lives greatly influences risk 
preferences. Yet, this reference dependence is 
not symmetric. People will try to avoid losses 
more than they will try to obtain gains—a 
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phenomenon termed loss aversion (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981). We have already shown 
that, in risky gambles, people typically avoid 
risk over gains. When experiencing a loss 
(a sure loss of $50 or a 50% chance of losing 
$100), however, people prefer risks to avoid 
the guaranteed loss. 
Hundreds of studies have documented the 
effects of reference dependence and loss aver-
sion in humans (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). 
If this is truly a bias, then we might expect to 
find it only in humans. But if framing effects 
offer an adaptive, ecologically rational advan-
tage, other animal species may exhibit them. 
Though first demonstrated in European star-
lings (Marsh & Kacelnik, 2002), Chen and 
colleagues (2006) explored reference depen-
dence and loss aversion in capuchin mon-
keys. To test reference dependence, the mon-
keys chose between two risky options. In one 
option, subjects saw one food reward and ei-
ther received one or two rewards with equal 
probability. In the other option, they saw two 
rewards and received either one or two re-
wards with equal probability. Though iden-
tical in outcome, the reference point (number 
of initial rewards) varied, resulting in a per-
ceived gain or loss. In this condition, subjects 
strongly preferred the gain option, show-
ing clear reference dependence. Another ex-
periment tested loss aversion. Here, one op-
tion consisted of seeing and then receiving a 
single reward, and the other option consisted 
of seeing two rewards but always receiving 
one. Again, the monkeys faced identical out-
comes—a guaranteed one reward—but re-
ceiving that one reward could have been 
neutral or perceived as a loss. Again, the 
monkeys avoided the loss option, revealing 
the precursors to loss aversion in nonhuman 
primates. Thus, we share framing effects with 
other primates, suggesting deep evolutionary 
roots for this phenomenon. 
Uncertainty Building Blocks 
Which evolved capacities does an organ-
ism need to cope with uncertainty and risk? 
When given a choice between risky gambles, 
a decision maker must compare the probabil-
ities of each outcome. In the human risk lit-
erature, subjects typically choose based on 
written descriptions of probabilities (e.g., 
a 50% chance) and/or on visual displays 
(e.g., a pie chart with half of the circle col-
ored in). These techniques allow fairly accu-
rate discriminations between probabilities. 
In the animal risk literature (and in some hu-
man experiments; see Hertwig et al., 2004), 
the subjects repeatedly experience the out-
comes to gauge the level of risk. Therefore, 
to choose between gambles, animals must 
discriminate probabilities based on experi-
enced outcomes. Though few studies have 
explicitly tested this, Weber’s law may de-
scribe probability discrimination. Both Her-
rnstein and Loveland (1975) and Bailey and 
Mazur (1990) showed that pigeons’ choices 
for the less risky option increased as the ra-
tio between the small to large probability de-
creased (probabilities became less similar). In 
addition, Bailey and Mazur and Krebs et al. 
(1978) showed that pigeons and starlings (re-
spectively) took more time to stabilize their 
preferences when the ratio between proba-
bilities increased, further suggesting diffi-
culty in discriminating similar probabilities. 
Thus, like numerical magnitude, probabil-
ity discrimination likely follows Weber’s law: 
Individuals can discriminate a 10% from a 
20% chance better than an 80% from a 90% 
chance. This has important implications for 
how animals deal with risk. When facing 
unlikely events, animals may discriminate 
probabilities well and therefore respond ap-
propriately to risk. For more likely events, 
however, animals may ignore the probabili-
ties and simply focus on the payoffs to deter-
mine choice. 
Time 
All decisions have a temporal component, 
from choosing to search for predators instead 
of searching for prey to delaying reproduc-
tion until the next breeding season. Delayed 
payoffs often have both benefits and costs 
(Stevens & Stephens, 2009). They may be 
beneficial when investing time in obtaining 
resources allows for the extraction of more 
resources. For instance, the more time chim-
panzees spend fishing for termites, the more 
termites they will extract. Yet, delayed re-
wards often come with a cost. 
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Temporal Discounting
When facing options with smaller, sooner 
payoffs and larger, later payoffs, animals 
must make an intertemporal choice; that is, 
they must trade off the magnitude of rewards 
with the delay to receiving them (reviewed 
in Read, 2004). In some cases, ignoring the 
temporal component and choosing based on 
magnitude is best, but in other cases, a long 
delay may prove too costly. How should an-
imals deal with this tradeoff? They may dis-
count or devalue delayed rewards because 
the future.is uncertain. The risk of not col-
lecting a reward grows with delay because 
some event may interrupt its collection. For 
instance, a predator may interrupt an ex-
tended courtship or a bank may collapse be-
fore an investment matures. Economists have 
modified the expected utility models to cre-
ate a discounted utility model of delayed ben-
efits (Samuelson, 1937). This model replaces 
p from the expected utility model with a dis-
counting function that includes a constant 
rate of interruption λ per unit time. Thus, for 
a reward amount A delayed for t time units, 
DU = e–λt × u(A). Again, utility is difficult to 
assess, so most versions of this model drop 
utility and just discount the absolute reward 
amount: V = A × e–λt . Because the value of a 
reward decays exponentially with time, this 
is called the exponential model of discounting 
(Figure 3).
Though intuitively appealing, the data do 
not support the exponential model. Humans, 
pigeons, and rats violate predictions of this 
model in self-control experiments (Figure 4) 
by choosing between a smaller, immediate re-
ward and a larger, delayed reward (Ainslie 
& Herrnstein, 1981; Frederick et al., 2002; Ma-
zur, 1987; Richards et al., 1997). In fact, when 
choosing between immediately receiving two 
pieces of food and waiting for six, rats and pi-
geons only wait a few seconds for three times 
as much food. Animals would have to face ex-
traordinarily (and unrealistically) high inter-
ruption rates for discounting by interruptions 
to account for this level of impulsivity.
Psychologists proposed an alternative 
model that captures the data much better: 
the hyperbolic discounting model (Ainslie, 1975; 
Mazur, 1987). In the hyperbolic model,6 V = 
A/(1 + kt), where k represents a fitted param-
eter that describes the steepness of discount-
ing. Rather than predict a constant rate of 
discounting over time, this model predicts a 
Figure 3. Models of intertemporal choice differ in their predictions about how the value of a reward 
decreases with the time delay to receiving the reward. Exponential discounting (red line) predicts a 
constant rate of decrease over time. Hyperbolic discounting (green line) predicts a decreasing rate of 
decrease over time, such that decision makers exhibit high discount rates at short-term delays but 
lower discount rates at longer delays. Rate maximization (blue line) predicts similar patterns as hy-
perbolic, albeit with strange behavior at very small time delays. The advantages of rate maximization 
models are that they include repeated choices and have biologically relevant parameters.
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decelerating rate over time—decision makers 
steeply discount at short time delays, and the 
rate of discounting declines at longer delays 
(Figure 3). This model nicely matches the 
data in humans, rats, and pigeons (Bickel & 
Johnson, 2003; Green et al., 2004). A number 
of studies have tested intertemporal choice in 
primate species, including cotton-top tama-
rins, common marmosets, brown capuchins, 
long-tailed and rhesus macaques, chim-
panzees, and bonobos (Dufour et al., 2007; 
Ramseyer et al., 2006; Rosati et al., 2007; Ste-
vens et al., 2005; Szalda-Petree et al., 2004; To-
bin et al., 1996). Unfortunately, we have too 
few quantitative data on primates to distin-
guish between these two models. Neverthe-
less, in cotton-top tamarins and common 
marmosets, the rate of discounting slows 
with time, contradicting predictions of the 
exponential model (Hallinan et al., unpub-
lished manuscript). 
Though the hyperbolic model has 
achieved great empirical success, it suffers 
from a critical disadvantage: like prospect 
theory, it is a purely descriptive model. It 
cannot make a priori predictions about inter-
temporal choices and thus lacks explanatory 
power (Stevens & Stephens, 2009). In addi-
tion, both exponential and hyperbolic mod-
els of discounting rest on the assumption of 
one-shot choice. In self-control experiments, 
however, animals face repeated choices be-
tween the same options, and the repeated na-
ture of these experiments has important im-
plications for models of intertemporal choice 
(Kacelnik, 2003; Stevens & Stephens, 2009). 
Rate 
The evolutionary approach to optimal 
foraging theory takes as its major assump-
tion the fact that animals maximize their in-
take rate, that is, the amount of food gained 
per unit time (Stephens & Krebs, 1986). In the 
classic patch-choice scenario, an animal trav-
els among the many patches of food in his 
or her environment and extracts resources 
from each patch. The question is: At what 
point should the animal stop extracting re-
sources from the current patch and move 
on to search for a new patch? This scenario 
sounds quite similar to the self-control situ-
ation tested in the laboratory. Animals must 
choose between staying in a patch for a short 
time to extract a small gain and staying for 
a longer time to extract a larger gain. Opti-
mal foraging theory makes predictions about 
how long to stay in a patch: stay until the in-
take rate drops below the background intake 
rate in the environment (Stephens & Krebs, 
1986). 
The rate-based approach to intertempo-
ral choice has two key advantages over the 
standard hyperbolic approach. First, it is by 
definition a model of repeated choice. Each 
decision faced by animals is embedded in a 
series of decisions. Thus, the rate-based ap-
proach models choices in situations very sim-
ilar to the self-control experiments. Second, 
rate models provide an explanation of the 
pattern of temporal preferences seen in ani-
mals rather than just a description. Animals 
that maximize their intake rates should sur-
vive and reproduce better than their counter-
parts that do not—rate models are built on a 
foundation of evolutionary fitness. 
We have sound theoretical reasons to fa-
vor rate models, but how do they fare em-
pirically? Actually, quite well. The short-
term rate model makes similar predictions as 
the hyperbolic model (Fig. 6.3). Bateson and 
Kacelnik (1996) first demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of the short-term rate model in de-
scribing choices by European starlings in a 
Figure 4. In self-control experiments, animals 
face a choice between a small reward (AS) after 
a short delay (tS) and a large reward (AL) after 
a long delay (tL). The animals wait for an inter-
trial interval, choose one option, wait the spec-
ified delay, consume their food, and then begin 
another intertrial interval. 
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self-control experiment.7 Stevens and col-
leagues (2005) then tested a variant of this 
model: A/(t + h), where h represents the time 
required to handle the food, an important 
component of the foraging timeline (Rosati 
et al., 2006). Cotton-top tamarins chose the 
option that maximized this intake rate. Like 
rats and pigeons, the tamarins waited only 6 
to 10 seconds for three times as much food. 
However, the results do not appear so “im-
pulsive” because we have an explanation for 
waiting such short delays that does not re-
quire unrealistic rates of interruption (Ste-
vens & Stephens, 2009). 
Data on bonobos also agree with rate 
maximization predictions, but this time long-
term rather than short-term rate predictions 
(Rosati et al., 2007). The long-term rate A/(τ 
+ t + h) includes τ, the time between trials (or 
between patches in the natural scenario). The 
long-term rate includes all of the relevant 
time intervals, and therefore this is the stan-
dard model used in optimal foraging theory. 
Why would some species ignore the intertrial 
interval while other species include it? An 
ecological rationality approach may help an-
swer this question. 
Ecological Rationality of 
Intertemporal Choice 
Tamarins and bonobos match predictions 
of rate-based models of intertemporal choice. 
Yet, bonobos wait over a minute for three 
times as much food, whereas tamarins wait 
less than 10 seconds. Why might the tamarins 
may use short-term rates when making these 
types of choices? An answer lies at the heart 
of ecological rationality. Namely, the natural 
decision environment strongly shapes the de-
cision mechanisms. Though the self-control 
experiments appear similar to natural patch-
foraging scenarios, a key difference arises: An-
imals rarely face simultaneous choices in na-
ture but often face sequential choices in patch 
situations. Rather than facing two binary op-
tions, animals regularly choose to stay or 
leave a patch. Stephens and Anderson (2001) 
argued that this represents the natural forag-
ing decision that animals typically confront, 
and therefore this should be the situation for 
which decision mechanisms evolved. Interest-
ingly, a decision rule that assesses short-term 
intake rates in a patch situation will automati-
cally result in long-term rate maximization be-
cause they are logically equivalent (Stephens 
& Anderson, 2001). 
If short- and long-term rules are logically 
equivalent, this then may explain why bono-
bos differ from the tamarins and marmosets. 
Both represent “adaptive peaks,” so it does 
not matter on which peak a particular species 
rests. Each rule, however, has advantages and 
disadvantages. The short-term rule has the 
advantage of simplicity and possibly higher 
accuracy. It is simpler because it ignores in-
formation, namely, the intertrial interval. This 
may also increase accuracy because, by ignor-
ing this time interval, animals can estimate 
much smaller intervals, which results in more 
accurate estimates (Stephens et al., 2004). De-
spite the benefits of the short-term rule, us-
ing the long-term rule provides advantages 
as well, primarily because it applies broadly 
and should result in the “correct” outcome in 
most cases. Unfortunately, this is not true for 
the short-term rule. Though the short-term 
rule works well in patch situations, this does 
not directly carry over to the self-control sit-
uation (Stephens & Anderson, 2001). In fact, 
as shown by the tamarins, the short-term rule 
results in “ impulsive” choice in self-control 
situations, so the animals do not achieve the 
optimal long-term rate of gain. Thus, tam-
arins may use the short-term rule because it 
works well in a natural foraging task-patch 
exploitation. When placed in an artificial sit-
uation, the rule “misfires.” Bonobos, in con-
trast, may possess more acute estimation abil-
ities and therefore use the more powerful 
long-term rule. 
Specialized diets also raise interesting 
questions about ecologically rational inter-
temporal choice. Common marmosets offer 
an intriguing case because they specialize on 
a rather unique food source: tree exudates. 
Marmosets have specialized teeth, as well 
as digestive morphology and physiology, 
adapted to gouging holes in tree bark and 
eating the sap and gum that exude from the 
holes (Rylands & de Faria, 1993; Stevenson & 
Rylands, 1988). Because this foraging strat-
egy requires waiting for the sap to exude, 
Stevens and colleagues (2005) proposed an 
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ecologically rational response to this type of 
foraging strategy: a decision mechanism that 
is biased toward waiting for longer delays. 
Compared to the more insectivorous tama-
rins, marmosets should show stronger pref-
erences for delayed rewards. As predicted, 
the marmosets waited longer than tamarins 
in a self-control situation, suggesting that the 
natural foraging ecology shapes the decision 
mechanisms (Stevens et al., 2005). 
Intertemporal Building Blocks 
Time poses unique cognitive challenges 
for organisms. Intertemporal choice com-
bines establishing preferences over rewards 
with tracking these payoffs over time. Now, 
we explore what kind of cognitive building 
blocks might be required to make inter tem-
poral choices. 
Time Perception 
To cope with delayed rewards, an organ-
ism must perceive the delay. Unfortunately, 
we know little about primate time percep-
tion. We do, however, know a lot about time 
perception in rats, which likely applies to pri-
mates. Like magnitude judgments, time in-
terval judgments seem to follow Weber’s 
law. In fact, Gibbon (1977) showed that vari-
ance scaled with magnitude in time percep-
tion before applying it to quantification. 
Given that both primate numerical judg-
ments (see Chapter 8) and human time per-
ception (Allan, 1998) follow Weber’s law, 
likely nonhuman primate time perception 
does as well. This has important implications 
for the study of intertemporal choice. First, 
logarithmic time perception (resulting from 
Weber’s law) may result in the hyperbolic 
pattern of intertemporal choice typically seen 
in both humans and other animals (Taka-
hashi, 2005; Takahashi et al., 2008) . This find-
ing could rescue the exponential model of 
discounting by overlaying a subjective time 
perception function. Second, as we have al-
ready seen, long time delays make discrim-
inating the delays difficult. If time delays 
are viewed as equivalent, decision makers 
should opt for the larger (and therefore later) 
reward, resulting in more patient choice. 
Delayed Gratification 
In addition to perceiving time, delayed 
rewards require a motivational ability to 
wait—decision makers must delay gratifica-
tion. Mischel and colleagues pioneered the 
study of delayed gratification by measuring 
how long children would wait for delayed 
rewards (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970; Mischel et 
al., 1989). They recorded the ability to wait at 
different ages and showed that delayed grati-
fication at a young age strongly predicted in-
telligence, academic success, standardized 
test scores, and drug use much later in life. 
Beran and colleagues have tested pri-
mates in a similar paradigm by offering 
chimpanzees and rhesus macaques a stream 
of food rewards (Beran et al., 1999; Evans & 
Beran, 2007b). The experimenter placed re-
wards in front of the subjects one by one at a 
particular rate, say one every 10 seconds. If 
the subject began consuming the food, how-
ever, the experimenter stopped the flow of 
food. Chimpanzees performed quite well 
on this task and some waited for over 10 
minutes for the stream of food to be com-
pleted (Beran & Evans, 2006). This corrob-
orates findings in the self-control task in 
which chimpanzees wait longer than any 
other species tested so far, including bono-
bos (Dufour et al., 2007; Rosati et al., 2007). 
Interestingly, this ability can be influenced 
by attentional factors. Evans and Beran 
(2007a) found that offering chimpanzees a 
distraction during the waiting period could 
significantly increase their abilities to de-
lay gratification. Thus, delayed gratification 
could provide a key building block required 
for patient choice, but it too is mediated by 
other factors such as attention. 
Conclusion 
Bounded rationality and ecological ratio-
nality are both firmly grounded in an evo-
lutionary perspective on decision making. 
Natural selection places limitations on cog-
nitive capacities and tailors cognitive mech-
anisms to the environment in which they are 
used (Barkow et al., 1992; Stevens, 2008). Dar-
win (1871, 1872) emphasized a continuity be-
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tween the “mental powers” of humans and 
other animals, and the analysis provided here 
confirms a similar continuity for decision 
making. Nonhuman primates show many 
of the so-called biases or anomalies demon-
strated by human decision makers. The hu-
man decision-making literature has high-
lighted these results as failures to achieve a 
normative outcome. The evolutionary ap-
proach suggests that the bias lies not in the 
behavior but in the normative criteria used. 
Organisms did not evolve to follow a math-
ematically tractable set of principles—rather, 
natural selection favored decision strategies 
that resulted in greater survival and repro-
duction. In some cases, the evolutionary and 
normative perspectives may overlap. How-
ever, the normative perspective often fails to 
properly account for the role of the environ-
ment in decision making, whereas this is a 
critical part of the evolutionary view. Natural 
selection shapes decision strategies to match 
the environment. 
This lesson about the limitations of the 
normative approach is an important one 
because many fields, especially neurosci-
ence, use tools borrowed from economics to 
greatly expand the study of decision mak-
ing. Though this could prove a fruitful en-
terprise, the data on decision making in 
other animals caution against relying exclu-
sively on the normative models of decision 
making. As a biological science, neurosci-
ence should heed the warning of Dobzhan-
sky (1964): “nothing makes sense in biol-
ogy except in light of evolution” (p. 449). Of 
course, the emphasis on evolutionarily plau-
sible models is nothing new to the field of 
neuroethology, and this tradition should 
continue in the study of decision making. 
Rather than looking for expected or dis-
counted utility in the brain, perhaps we 
should test hypotheses about the bounded 
and ecological rationality of decision mak-
ing. The bounded rationality approach 
makes clear predictions about what cogni-
tive building blocks might be recruited, and 
neuroscience can help test this. In addition, 
neuroscience can allow us to explore what 
aspects of the environment are relevant for 
triggering specific decision rules. The neu-
roethological approach offers an ideal inter-
face between the evolutionary and mecha-
nistic approaches to decision making. 
The study of primate decision making 
has much to offer the larger field of decision 
making, and prospects are bright for future 
contributions. To advance the field, we must 
begin exploring primate decisions in the wild 
or at least in more naturalistic situations. 
Currently, most studies of primate decisions 
(and animal decisions more broadly) occur 
in the laboratory with rather artificial sce-
narios. Though these studies provide valu-
able information on primate decision mak-
ing, they may also lead us astray. If natural 
selection tailors decision mechanisms to the 
environment in which they are adapted, then 
the artificial nature of the laboratory might 
not trigger the appropriate mechanism. In 
this case, behavior seen in both humans and 
other animals may simply be spurious re-
sults elicited by an unnatural environment 
(Houston et al., 2007b; Stevens & Stephens, 
2009). Thus, exploring natural behaviors in 
natural environments underlies our under-
standing of primate decisions. 
Another important advance that primate 
researchers may offer is the development 
and testing of process models of decision 
making. David Marr (1982) introduced the 
idea of three levels of information process-
ing. The computational level emphasizes the 
goal of the system, the algorithmic level em-
phasizes the processes used, and the imple-
mentational level emphasizes the neural cir-
cuitry required to process information. Most 
models of decision making in animals act at 
the computational level—that is, level of evo-
lutionary function—in the field of behav-
ioral ecology or the implementational level 
in the field of neurobiology. The algorith-
mic level has been greatly neglected as a rel-
evant level of analysis. Yet, adding an anal-
ysis of the relevant cognitive processes and 
algorithms could constrain and improve evo-
lutionary models of decision making. Only 
an integrative approach across these levels of 
analysis—from the evolutionary to the psy-
chological to the neurobiological—will yield 
satisfying answers to questions of the nature 
of decision making. 
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Notes 
1. Utility does not necessarily increase linearly 
with magnitude. The difference between 
consuming one and three bananas is not the 
same as the difference between consuming 
11 and 13 bananas. A difference of two ba-
nanas is much more relevant when there are 
fewer to begin with. 
2. Kahneman and Tversky do not use the term 
“ irrational.” They describe deviations from 
the normative theory as “ biases,” “falla-
cies,” or “cognitive illusions.” Nevertheless, 
the emphasis on putative errors highlights 
the irrational nature of human decision 
making (Rieskamp et al., 2006a). 
3. Most work on decision making in animals, 
including primates, involves food as the re-
ward, though there are important excep-
tions (Deaner et al., 2005). Therefore, in this 
review, I will also focus on food as the re-
ward domain. Nevertheless, many of the 
principles mentioned here apply to other re-
ward domains, and the study of animal de-
cision making needs more in-depth explora-
tion of other reward types. 
4. Though we have few data on transitive prefer-
ence, transitive inference is well studied in pri-
mates. Transitive preference refers to an or-
dered preference over choices. Transitive 
inference refers to the ability to infer a tran-
sitive relation between objects (Vasconcelos, 
2008). For instance, if individual A is domi-
nant to B, and B is dominant to C, can an indi-
vidual infer that A is dominant to C without 
actually seeing A and C interact? Primates 
are quite good at these tasks, both with arbi-
trary objects in artificial laboratory tasks (re-
viewed in Tomasello & Call, 1997) and with 
social agents in the more naturalistic social in-
ferences (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). 
5. Despite the sparse data on animal intransi-
tivity, Houston and colleagues (Houston, 
1997; Houston et al., 2007a) have developed 
a series of models demonstrating that in-
transitivity might be a perfectly adaptive 
strategy when a decision maker is either 
updating his or her assessment of the en-
vironment or betting on a changing envi-
ronment. Schuck-Paim and Kacelnik (2004) 
also assert that intransitive choices (partic-
ularly when food is the reward) can be per-
fectly biologically rational (Kacelnik, 2006) 
when the internal state changes (i.e., deci-
sion makers become satiated). 
6. Though V = A/(1 + kt) is called the hyperbolic 
model, it represents only a single instance 
from a class of hyperbolic models. In fact, 
most nonexponential models (including the 
rate models) are hyperbolic. Nevertheless, 
the term “hyperbolic discounting” typically 
refers to Mazur’s (1987) version. 
7. The key difference between the short-term 
and long-term rate models is that the short-
term model ignores the travel time or in-
tertrial interval. Thus, animals using the 
short-term rate only focus on the times be-
tween choice presentation and reward 
consumption. 
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